The first question to ask when considering a motion to suppress is whether or not a warrant was issued for the search; more often than not no warrant is issued for a search of a vehicle during a traffic stop.  Vehicles are effects within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment provision guaranteeing the right of people to be secure in their effects against unreasonable searches, and automobile stops constitute seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes.  People v. Abad, 98 N.Y.2d 12, 16 (N.Y. 2002).   Further, not only a driver, but a passenger as well has the right to challenge the stop and search of the automobile as well as to challenge any evidence recovered there from.  People v. Fore, 131 A.D.2d 329, 330 (1st Dep’t 1987).

If no warrant was issued for the search, the next inquiry to consider is whether the facts traffic stop and search and seizure permitted an exception to the requirement for a warrant.  Common exceptions to the warrant requirement include the following:

• Consent – an individual can consent (give permission) for a warrantless search, if consent was given no warrant is required
• Plain view – if the evidence recovered was in plain view then no warrant is required.  However, for the plain view exception to prevail, the officer must have viewed the property from a location the officer was legally permitted to be (ie: outside the window of the vehicle) and the property seized must be contraband on its face (meaning clearly illegal to possess the item seized).
• Inventory search – if a driver of a vehicle is arrested and the car is to be towed, police officers are permitted to search the vehicle in order to inventory the property inside to prevent loss of the property while the vehicle is impounded.  People v. Taylor, 92 A.D.3d 961 (2d Dep’t 2012); People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386 (N.Y. 1984).
• Search incident to arrest – if an individual is arrested, a limited search, incident to the arrest, may be conducted to search for weapons and or preserve evidence of the crimes for which the individual was arrested.

Ultimately, a warrantless search and seizure is evaluated for reasonableness – the inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of the search and seizure is whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstance which justified the interference in the first place.  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (U.S. 1985).

For example, if an officer stops a vehicle for an illegal u-turn, the illegal u-turn is what justified and created the predicate for the stop in the first place and any additional search or seizure must be reasonably related in scope to the illegal u-turn which justified the interference (traffic stop) in the first place.  A subsequent search of the center console, for example, is not reasonably related in scope to an illegal u-turn as no further evidence of the illegal u-turn could possible be found in the center console – thus in this circumstance the warrantless search was not reasonable since the search of the center console is not reasonably related in scope to the illegal u-turn, the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle and seizure of the property inside was therefore not reasonable.

Suppression motions are fact specific and the motion papers must clearly aver that the defendant was searched by a police officer without probable cause or other legal justification in order to adequately plead a legal basis for suppression.  People v. Burton, 6 N.Y.3d 584, 588 (N.Y. 2006). When successful, suppression motions often result in dismissal of the criminal charges, since commonly the physical evidence is the only proof of the alleged crimes.

In responding to a Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bear the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists over the defendants. See Distefano v. Carozzi North America, Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001). However, pre-discovery plaintiffs “need only make a prima facie case showing” that the Court has jurisdiction over the defendants. Id.  Plaintiffs “need not show regular or continuous activity in the state; even a single act within New York is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 302(a) if it has sufficient nexus with the cause of action.” Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. J.V.W. Investments Ltd., 120 F. Supp.2d 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted).

There is only one Court of Appeals case that has dealt with this specific personal jurisdiction issue.  Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002).  In Lee the 9^th Circuit ruled that New York law enforcement officials “took the ‘deliberate actions’ of requesting that the LAPD arrange the extradition of a purported fugitive, using the California criminal justice system to accomplish the extradition, sending the LAPD an identification packet to facilitate the extradition, regularly communicating with the LAPD during the extradition process, and traveling to Los Angeles to escort the purported fugitive back to New York.” Id. at 693. The Court found that those New York defendants who participated actively in the plaintiff’s extradition to New York had “purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California.” Id. at 694.

Under New York law, a court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based either on general jurisdiction under [New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”)] § 301, or specific jurisdiction, under CPLR § 302.” Overseas Ventures, LLC v. ROW Mgmt., Ltd., No. 12-CV-1033, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159097, 2012 WL 5363782, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2012). “Under CPLR § 301 general jurisdiction, which arises out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum even if the contacts are unrelated to the action before the Court, is established over a foreign [defendant] engaging in a ‘continuous and systematic course of doing business in New York.'” TAGC Mgmt., LLC v. Lehman, 842 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  Under Section 302(a) the state can obtain long arm jurisdiction if:

Section 302(a) provides in relevant part:

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:

1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or
   2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
   3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he

(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or

4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.

CPLR § 302 emphasis added

Personal jurisdiction is acquired over the foreign state Defendants based on either Section 302(a)(2) and/or 302(a)(3).  Based upon CPLR § 302(a)(2) a venue acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant, “commits a tortious act within the state”  Davis v. United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2551, 03civ1800 (NRB), 2004 WL 324880, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004) (finding personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state law enforcement agent under §302(a) based on the fact that the agent was present in the State of New York during the arrest),  CPLR § 302(a)(2).  Furthermore, in federal cases involving § 1983 claims arising out of a single arrest in New York State of which the out-of-state defendant was present and participated in the actual arrest it is held that the defendant is subject to suit in New York pursuant to CPLR § 302(a).  Under this set of facts Davis v. United States, unequivocally finds a sufficient nexus for personal jurisdiction.

“At the center of plaintiff’s case is his arrest, which occurred within New York State. As it is undisputed that Agent Delia was present at and participated in plaintiff’s arrest, this Court has jurisdiction over him for claims arising out of that arrest. Because each of plaintiff’s claims is related to the criminal investigation and prosecution that were carried out with respect to plaintiff, there is a sufficient nexus between the jurisdictional act and the present causes of action. Accordingly, this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over Agent Delia.”

Further, “Plaintiffs need not show regular or continuous activity in the state; even a single act within New York is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 302(a) if it has sufficient nexus with the cause of action.'” Davis v. United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2551, 2004 WL 324880, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. J.V.W. Investments Ltd., 120 F.Supp.2d 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). One transaction is sufficient to support jurisdiction under § 302 “so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.” Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, [WL] at *9 (quoting Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 522 N.E.2d 40, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1988)).  See also Scott v. NASCAR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5039 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008).  Clearly, as discussed in Davis the act of traveling to the state of New York in order to participate in an arrest of a New York resident creates a sufficient nexus between the jurisdiction and the defendant to acquire jurisdiction under§ 302.

The importance of a good working relationship with the Parole Officer is best illustrated by examining the role that the Parole Officer plays in the supervision process, a process that starts with the development of a supervision plan for each parolee.  Supervision can include visiting, unannounced, the residence and/or work location of the parolee, meetings with the parolee at the office of the Parole Officer, as well as random drug testing.  After the supervision plan is established, the role of the PO expands from there.

First, the Parole Officer, in consultation with his or her supervisor, determines when and under what circumstances a delinquency action is warranted for parole violations.  In short, whether the parolee has his/her parole revoked and is returned to confinement is largely dependent on the Parole Officers perception of the alleged parole violation; if the PO is convinced a parole violation occurred – more likely than not, the parolee will be back in prison.  An established good working relationship, simply because of human nature, will put the Parole officer on your side, or, at least render the PO less determined to see the parolee locked up again.

Second, the Parole Officer assess and evaluate the adequacy of each parolee’s community adjustment and intervenes when parolee behavior threatens that adjustment; a determination that informs as to the length of time that the parolee should remain under community supervision.  In other words, the duration of time of the parole and the length of time for which a parolee must continue to report is by and large dependent upon the recommendations of the Parole Officer.  If the PO and parolee have a good working relationship, the Parole Officer is more likely to issue a positive recommendation thus reducing the need for continued supervision and reporting.

Third, the Parole Officer is most often the avenue for making special requests such as for travel, or, for petitioning for relief from civil disabilities imposed as a result of conviction.  In simple terms, want to visit family outside the jurisdiction – the Parole Officer must agree; want to obtain a professional license, or vote – the Parole Officers acquiescence is key to the request being granted.

Parolees need to remember that, believe it or not, Parole Officers are people too and they are subject to the same biases and slanted perceptions as the rest of us.  If you don’t like someone, aren’t you more likely to look at them with suspicion?  The same goes for Parole Officers, truth be told, if they don’t like the parolee, they are more likely to look at the parolee with suspicion.  A good working relationship humanizes the parolee and can put the PO on your side, working for the parolee rather than against.